Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1999

Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of
American Law Schools Section on Employment Discrimination
Law: Is There a Disconnect Between EEO Law and the Workplace?
Douglas D. Scherer
Touro Law Center, dougscherer@verizon.net

James C. Sharf
Richard T. Seymour
Maria O'Brien Hylton
Paulette Caldwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglas D. Scherer , James C. Sharf , Richard T. Seymour, Maria O'Brien Hylton & Paulette Caldwell,
Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Employment
Discrimination Law: Is There a Disconnect Between EEO Law and the Workplace, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 131 (1999).

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 ANNUAL MEETING,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS SECTION ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: IS THERE A
DISCONNECT BETWEEN EEO LAW AND THE
WORKPLACE?
(The following is an edited transcript of the proceedings of the
section on Employment Discrimination Law at the AALS Annual
Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 9, 1999.)

DOUGLAS D. SCHERER*: Good morning. The program descrip
tion asks the question, “Is there a disconnect between existing EEO
jurisprudence and the realities of the workplace and workforce of the
Twenty-First Century?” Societal disapproval of employment dis
crimination is reflected in federal EEO laws that have been enacted
during the last thirty-six years and in court interpretations of these
laws. The goals of these laws are fairly clear. It is less clear how well
these goals have been achieved. Of more importance for this morn
ing’s session, serious questions can be raised concerning the extent to
which these laws connect to the forms of discrimination that are
emerging and that are becoming visible as the workforce and work
place change. These issues will be addressed this morning by our su
perb panel of speakers.
In the order in which they will speak, our speakers are: Dr. Jim
Sharf, Attorney Rick Seymour, Professor Maria O’Brien Hylton, and
Professor Paulette Caidwell. Our first speaker, Dr. Sharf, is an indus
trial psychologist and a management consultant who assists employer
clients with EEO compliance and litigation support. Earlier in his ca
reer, he was a staff psychologist with the EEOC and drafted the 1978
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. Later, he
served as special assistant to the EEOC Chair and drafted sections of
Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Chair-Elect and Pro
gram Chair, AALS Section on Employment Discrimination Law.
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the 1991 Civil Rights Act. We are very fortunate to have Dr. Sharf
with us this morning.
Our second speaker will be Attorney Rick Seymour. Mr.
Seymour is the Director of the Employment Discrimination Project of
the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and is the pre
mier Title VII class action litigator in the country. He has been the
attorney for a party or an amicus curiae in most of the emloyment
discrimination cases decided by the U. S. Supreme Court during the
last fifteen years. He is co-author of the B.N.A. publication Equal
Employment Law Update and publishes an excellent newsletter, Civil
Rights Act and EEO News. He will provide a connection between
theoretical doctrine and the realities of employment discrimination
litigation.
Our third speaker will be Professor Maria O’Brien Hylton of
Boston University School of Law, who teaches and writes in the field
of employee benefits. Her extensive scholarship demonstrates that
she is a thoughtful, original, and independent writer, and her recently
completed casebook on employee benefits will be used by many peo
ple in this room and by a large portion of the professors across the
country who teach employee benefits law. Her presentation will pro
vide a bridge between employee benefits law and employment dis
crimination law. Those who teach employment law and employment
discrimination law should realize that lawyers for plaintiffs are be
coming increasingly sophisticated about ERISA and are looking for
ERISA claims lurking in fact patterns that previously would have
been viewed as raising only statutory discrimination or common law
claims. Quite often, the ERISA claim is the one that is most likely to
succeed.
Our fourth speaker will be Professor Paulette Caldwell of New
York University School of Law. Professor Caldwell is well known for
her work in the area of race, and her intersectionality scholarship
helped develop the way we conceptualize the field of employment
discrimination. We are very fortunate to have her with us this morn
ing, to give us her thoughts and tie together the presentations of all
four speakers.
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JAMES C. SHARF, PH.D.~: I feel very ambitious, “carrying coals to
Newcastle,” speaking to you attorneys about the law, but I’ll show
you a view from the scientist-practitioner’s standpoint, that of an in
dustrial psychologist whose day-in and day-out work deals with the
burdens defined by regulation, statute and professional employment
testing standards. I also want to acknowledge my teacher, my very
first law teacher, Rick Seymour, who is on the program here. Rick
got hold of me back in 1972 when I was an aspiring assistant professor
in the business school at American University, back in Washington.
Griggs’ had come down in 1971. I didn’t know what Griggs was all
about, but I was curious. Rick invited me to learn about employment
law in his capacity as lead attorney at the Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights under Law. We challenged the “job-relatedness” of the
then Federal Service Entrance Exam at the U.S. Civil Service Com
mission and won in the Federal District Court. At least as important
as the court victory was the very first lesson I leaned under Rick’s tu
telage. This was the meanings of the words pro bono. I have never
regretted that lesson.
The employment litigation trends I have written about are sev
eral. Let me give you my conclusions before discussing each in turn.
Of surprise to most employers, first of all, is that over the last decade,
employment litigation is more likely to have been “tort claims”
brought under common law then employment discrimination claims
brought under federal statutes. Second, when arguing under federal
statute, plaintiffs’ attorneys will allege disparate treatment so that
they can argue before a jury where they are twice as likely to win than
would be the case arguing disparate impact before a judge.
Third, common law settlements and judgments pay more in puni
tive and compensatory damages than capped awards available under
federal statutes. The fourth trend I will show is that incumbents and
former employees are almost seven times more likely to sue than ap
plicants for employment. And finally, employers are four hundred
times more likely to be sued by private plaintiffs’ attorneys than by
the EEOC.
Now, how do I get to these conclusions about these employment
litigation trends? Well, follow me on this. Prior to Congress’ passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,2 Title VII3 and Americans with Disabili
President, Sharf & Associates.
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. Pub. L. No. 102466, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. §~ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
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ties Act (ADA)4 claims were only heard before a judge, never before
a jury. Monetary awards under these federal statutes were equitable
“make-whole” relief, limited to reinstatement and reimbursement for
back pay. Up until 1989, a post-Civil War statute known as Section
1981 of 42 U.S. Code5 had been broadly used by plaintiffs’ attorneys
to obtain uncapped pain and suffering awards and punitive damages
when racial disparate treatment was found in making any employ
ment decision. Disparate treatment, as you know, is treating similarly
situated individuals differently with respect to a prohibited classifica
tion such as race or gender. In 1989, however, the Supreme Court’s
Patterson6 decision held that Section 1981 was limited to the making
of contracts. Thereafter, only hiring decisions could be challenged
under Section 1981.
All the while, over the past two decades, there has been a grow
ing precedent of uncapped compensatory and punitive tort damages
awarded by juries to plaintiffs who successfully challenge employment
decisions under common law. I need not go into explanation of what
common law is to you folks. I, however, am still waiting for a cogent
explanation of what a tort is, but that’s another discussion. Tort
claims do not deal with contracts, such as the decision to hire or fire
someone. Employment torts deal with civil wrongs against a person,
such as pain and suffering resulting from employment decisions or
discharge in violation of public policy. I found that tort claims are
most frequently argued by plaintiffs challenging employers’ layoff de
cisions. What can we conclude about employment tort trends?
Whatis confounding about trying to generalize from the prece
dent of common law decisions is that each state and the District of
Columbia has its own set of judge-interpreted precedents. So a com
mon law precedent in California. which Rick Seymour will point out
is a hot-bed of tort litigation, may not offer much guidance to a litiga
tor in New York State. It is the unpredictability of outcomes when
dealing with common law decisions that gives employment risk man
gers real heart-burn.
According to David Copus, a colleague in the Washington office
of Jones Day:
Tort theories pose enormous risks for all employers because
of the increasing creativity of plaintiffs’ lawyers, the increasing
4. 42 U.S.C. §~ 12101-12213 (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
6. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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willingness of common law judges to find ways to permit
plaintiffs to recover tort damages, and the essentially unlim
ited nature of tort damages. The risk from tort liability far ex
ceeds the risk posed by federal statutory civil rights violations
in almost every case.7
Where do federal statutes come into play when analyzing em
ployment litigation trends? The Civil Right Act of 1991, sections of
which I helped draft as Special Assistant to EEOC’s Chairman, sub
stantially increased employment risks beyond those under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and its amendments in 1972. Section 102 of the
Civil Rights of 1991 changed monetary incentives for plaintiffs’ attor
neys by now allowing for monetary compensatory and punitive dam
ages in both Title VII and ADA cases involving intentional discrimi
nation based upon the disparate treatment theory of discrimination.8
Title VII and ADA plaintiffs now get a jury trial when damages are
sought for employment decisions in which intentional discrimination
is alleged. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory dam
ages include future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, in
convenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and any other pecuniary losses.
These damages are in addition to equitable “make-whole” relief such
as reinstatement and back pay which had previously been available.
Punitive damages are now awarded when a plaintiff can demonstrate
that the employer acted with “malice” or with “reckless indiffer
ence.”9
Figure 1 shows that between 1989 and 1995, 57 percent of all em
ployment discrimination claims were brought under common law.
Simply stated, more than half of all employment claims in the past
decade were not based on federal EEO status. In addition to claims
of discrimination, common law claims include intentional infliction of
emotion pain and suffering and, to a lesser extent, invasions of pri
vacy. Even though monetary damages are available under Title VII,
tort damage claims are still brought under common law in a civil trial
before a jury because there is no cap on monetary awards. In con
trast, of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 caps individual claims at
between $50,000 and $300,000 depending on the size of the employer.
So as to Doug’s first question posed to this panel which is, “Are the
federal statutory remedies appropriate remedies for discrimination,?”
7. D. Copus, Employment Law 101 Deskbook, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT L. INST. 56 (1996).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
9. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n. 119 5. Ct. 2118 (1999).
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Figure 1 shows they are not.
Among cases brought under federal EEO statutes, 18 percent of
all employment cases involve claims of age, 9 percent race, 6 percent
disability, and 10 percent other, primarily sex discrimination. Figure
2 shows a $408,000 average per award when combing both statutory
and common law claims. Common law awards were above that aver
age dollar figure. Given the absence of monetary caps under com
mon law, it would hardly be in a plaintiff’s interest to bring charges
primarily on statutory grounds. Figure 1 basically shows the plain
tiff’s attorney’s preference for alleging employment discrimination
under common law, and the dollar amounts in Figure 2 convincingly
reveal why this is so.
When I examined the EEOC’s federal statute claims data, I
found that the least likely charges, comprising about 2 percent each,
are religious discrimination and comparable worth arguments. Na
tional origin claims have decreased somewhat over the past decade,
remaining relatively constant at about 8 percent. Disability claims
became actionable in 1992 and now comprise slightly more than 20
percent of all charges, a level that has been relatively constant for the
last five years. Retaliation claims have increased year-by-year to the
point today where they comprise about 20 percent of all claims. Sex
discrimination accounts for about 30 percent of the claims. Notwith
standing press reports to the contrary, those sex discrimination figures
have been quite constant over the past decade. What is notable in
Table 1 is the declining significance of race claims. Although race
discrimination accounted for 36 percent of the charges in fiscal year
1997, this figure has steadily deceased since the beginning of the dec
ade.
With respect to EEOC’s batting averages, notwithstanding sev
eral highly publicized class action cases, for most employers the
EEOC is not the threat that it once was when it comes to the risk of
litigation. An examination of all charges with the EEOC in 1994 re
veals that “no cause” and “administratively closed,” categories each
accounted for about 30 percent of all changes. The latter, “adminis
tratively closed,” typically consists of a charging party’s failure to re
spond to Commission correspondence. One quarter of all charges
were added to the “back log.” This means that 88 percent of all
charges either went into “back log,” were administratively closed,” or
were “dismissed” for lack of merit. Eleven percent were otherwise
disposed of, which includes finding a violation.
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What is most revealing are the following two statistics with re
gard to EEOC enforcement. First, of all, in less than 1 percent of the
cases was settlement reached after the commission issued a cause
finding. Second, the commission filed suit in less than one half of 1
percent of all cases. Since fewer than half of all discrimination claims
were brought under federal statutes, and since less than half of 1 per
cent of those involved the EEOC bringing suit, this means that the
Commission was a party in less than one quarter of 1 percent of em
ployment litigation. In other words, 400 claims are filed by plaintiffs’
attorneys for each case brought by the EEOC.
According to David Copus who has worked for the EEOC and
now represents employers: “Created by Congress with the best of in
tentions, 30 years later the EEOC has become little more than a pa
per shuffling agency.”
In 1997, a corporate sample from the Fortune One Hundred was
asked to document their use of objective selection procedures. Fortythree corporations responded. Objective measures, primarily em
ployment tests, were used in 40 percent of all selection employment
decision-making. A similar survey done by my industrial-psychologist
colleagues showed a similar base line between 40 percent and 44
percent of all employment decisions involved the, use of employment
tests.”
Figure 3 shows the distribution of employment test use by busi
ness categories while Figure 4 shows which objective measures were
used. Not surprisingly, interviews continue to be the universal work
horse of employment decision-making. used in about 99 percent of all
employment decisions. But the 40 percent figure, for the use of an
employment test, has been a quite consistent baseline. The second
and third most frequently used ‘assessments were resumes, and expe
rience and education inquiries, each conducted by about 70 percent of
corporate employers. The source of information was complemented
by background checks which were conducted in about a third of the
programs, and references were checked about a quarter of the time.
Table 2 shows EEOC’s FY ‘97 charges summarized by statute
and basis code. The right hand column “Percent of All Charges,”
—

10. ID. Copus, “Employment Discrimination Law Revisited,” Presentation to Personnel
Testing Council of Southern California. Los Angeles. CA. (Feb. 1997).
11. N. Tippins & S. Wunder, “Entry-level Management and Professional Selection: Best
and Most Common Practices (Are They the Same?), Workshop presented at the meeting of the
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, St. Louis, MO (April 1997).
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summarizes across Title 7, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination
Employment Act, and the American with Disabilities Act. First of
all, hiring accounted for only 7 percent of those charges, while dis
charge accounted for 47 percent. This means that as far as assigning
risks in employment, an employer is seven times more likely to be
sued by an incumbent or former employee than by an applicant.
Although used in 40 percent of the Fortune One Hundred and by
44 percent of the American Management Association member com
panies, objective test procedures did not even show up on the
EEOC’s radar. Challenges to employment tests account for threetenths of 1 percent of all EEOC’s charges. This lower risk profile for
employment testing was also confirmed in separate surveys that Keith
Pyburn of McCalla Thompson here in New Orleans conducted which
further documented the decline in employment testing case law cita
tions.’2
Now, if we said that interviews are the most common employ
ment decision-making systems, and challenges to hiring decisions rep
resent only 7 percent of the charges, it is nevertheless likely that cas
ual interviews would be displaced in place of more structured
patterned interviews. Basically the reason is this. Ninety-none per
cent of all employment decisions involve interviews. A structured in
terview is looked at as a disparate impact instrument. It’s objective; it
is, in fact, not susceptible to disparate treatment kinds of challenges.
It’s the unstructured, discretionary type of casual interview that in
vites a disparate treatment argument which is, of course, advanta
geous to the plaintiff because it goes before a jury. Disparate impact,
of course, goes before a judge.
So, the long-term trend is this. Objective procedures are a good
risk management strategy. They are certainly cost effective in terms
of the exposure for employment testing. Forty to 44 percent of all
employment decisions use employment tests. The EEOC’s figures
show that three tenths of 1 percent involve employment tests. Recall
that Figure 1 revealed that only 43 percent of all discrimination
charges involve federal statutes. So that three tenths of 1 percent in
terms of the Commission’s base rate should be cut in half, given both
combined statutory and common law bases. There is exposure baserate of 44 percent test use but only about one to two tenths of 1 per
cent of the risk of litigation. When you look at the employment in12. K. Pyburn, “Trends in Cases Involving Employment Tests,” Presentation to Personnel
Testing Council of Northern California, Sacramento, CA (March 1996).
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terview and other assessment procedures, the structured assessment
lends itself to a disparate impact challenge. It is less risky for the em
ployer to defend a disparate impact case because the plaintiff is twice
as likely to win a disparate treatment case before a jury than an im
pact case before a judge.
So my overall conclusions are first that federal statutes are being
superceded by common law claims and second that an effective em
ployment risk strategy is to displace subjective, unstructured assess
ments in favor of objective selection procedures. I continue to main
tain that the use of objective, job-related employment procedures is
the cornerstone of a color and gender-blind society. This is not only a
desirable public policy; it also makes good business sense because it
lowers employment risk.
Thank you.
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Figure 1
Proportion of Employment Claims Based on Federal
Statutes and Common law, 1989-1 995
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Figure 3
Psychological Testing by Business Category
Percentage Distribution
AMA Members, 1996
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Figure 4
Objective Measures Used by 40% of Surveyed Fortune 100 Employers

Assessment Center

0
Jots Trial/Probation
Work Simulation
Academics/CPA
References

13%

-

Other

25%

___

:

t~j

31%
_______

BackgronmtCtse:k

H

___

~

Job Performance

0
8%

32%

_______

‘0
‘0

36% 0%

-

Campus tnterviesv

10%

nrugScreen

6
____

Resomes/Esp/RdnC

____
______________

Sitejoterview
0%

______________

i_I

-

10%

20%

____

____

____

______________

______________

~-~≤:

-- —

30%

0
71%

40%

50%

60%

70%

I
80%

60%

100%
U)

144

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JO URNAL [Vol. 3:131
TABLE

1:

FY 1990 FY 1991
Total
Charges

U.S. EQUAL
FY 1990 THROUGH 1997

CHARGE STATISTICS FROM THE

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
FY 1992

FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997

62,135

63,898

72,302

87,942

91,189

87,529

77,990

80,680

Race

29,121
46.7%

27,981
43.8%

29,548
40.9%

31,695
36.0%

31,656
34.8%

29,986
34.3%

26,287
33.8%

29,199
36.2%

Sex

17,815
28.5%

17,672
27.7%

21,796
30.1%

23,919
27.2%

25,860
28.4%

26,181
29.9%

23,813
30.6%

24,728
30.7%

7,236
11.6%

6,692

10.5%

7,434
10.3%

7,454
8.5%

7,414
8.1%

7,035
8.0%

6,687
8.6%

6.712
8.3%

1,147
1.8%

1,192
1.9%

1,388
1.9%

1,449
1.6%

1,546
1.7%

1,581
1.8%

1,564
2.0%

1,709
2.1%

7,579
12.1%

7,906
12.4%

10,932
14.4%

12,644
14.4%

14,315
15.8%

15,342

17.5%

14,412
18.5%

22.5%

14,719
23.6%

17,550
27.5%

19,573
27.1%

19,809
22.5%

19,618
21.5%

17,416
19.9%

15,719
20.2%

15,785
19.6%

na

na

***1,048
1.4%

15,274
17.4%

18,859
20.7%

19,798
22.6%

18,046
23.1%

18,108
•22.4%

1,345
2.2%

1,187
1.9%

1,294
1.8%

1,328
1.5%

1,381
1.5%

1,275
1.5%

969
1.2%

1,134
1.4%

National
Origin
Religion
Retaliation
Age
Disability
Equal Pay
Act

18,113

The number for Total Charges reflects the number of individual charge filings. Because
individuals often ifie charges under multiple bases, the number of Total Charges for any given
fiscal year wifi be less than the total for the eight bases listed.
** Statistics for FY 1996 are preliminary data.
*** EEOC began enforcing the Americans with Disabilities Act on July 26, 1992.
Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1997.

1999]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 ANNUAL MEETiNG

I

CC~
-~

~~C0~N

—

C.~cC~N•C~

~

~0CC

~0
N

-~

—

N

00

~4~~j0~j

~‘âc~

~

~2~5

~

~

145

N

~OCo~C0C0CC 0°~o~ 00.C0°~—~N
CNC0°0°C ~ C0~0CCo
0~CCC,-oN
~NC ‘00°
0~0
,~
C CO Co
C Co N
N
N
00
(~
—

NC0~C Co~NNCoC Co~-~C C’0
~
COCCo CCOC
C
0°N000NC
NC0°
C ~
Co
‘0
C N
‘0
—
Co
C
—
CO

NCOON’00OCo

‘0000°NNC

~

~

O0000°~

CC

CNCCCC CCCCCCC

CC~’CCC CCCC

CC

CcOCCOO
NCO
NCC

CCCNNC C~00°0°
Co~-)Co CC0C0
C 0°
Co
— — Co

NC ~
CC
C —
C CO N
N —

CCNOOC0°
NCOCONCo

N0
C’-C

CCC) C0000NCONco ‘~‘‘NCCoN CoN~-~0~0 CoCCCCON0°
N~CNCN ~‘CNCCo 0°C
CoN CoCOCCC
0
C 0 N
Co N N
C
C
O~
—
t~.
~

Co’.~C’0C

CONNNC
C~-)C
C
N

—

—

CC0~0 C
N~’0N
—
CO CO
C
—

CO
0

C/N
CCCCCCC

UN
UN

CCCCCC

C

0~

>0

00NN’00°C~ CNCN0j~fl
-CN0000’0N
CCo0°’0
~
0° N C
0°
C
Co
C —
N —

>0

0°

N~00°CCo-’

CCOCNCN
—
0°
CO
0°

N —

NNN~Co~C ~N~-0NN oo0°NC~0N
CC0C0C~r.4 NCN~0C
~.
CC
~ N
CO N C
CC C
~
Co
N
— N
—
—

C’)
UN
UN

N

0°00C0°~N~
0°CNC’)C0°

—

— N Co

CCCNNCoN Co0°CCNCO 0°C~oNCC
0°
Co
0°
0° N C — N
0°
Co
~
—

N N

C~0°C
00000°C

~
N

N

0°

C 000° C
— C 0° —
NC

~CCNC CCo0°0°0°,.) CNNC CoCo
—
C —
C
~
C C C
—
CO
C 0°~-~ —
— Nj-’

01:
CO~0

C 0° N
N ‘00°

0° N C N CO
* C N
~

N0~Cco

CoCCCC’0

c.1~

0° C
C

N

0°

— C Co
N C — C
— C C’0
C
Cfl

C Co CO ‘0000° C
0° ~~CO C
C
,oCN
CO
CN
N

CNCN0°C

CCo0°NNC

~-1’0C,.-C

N

,~0

CC

CC0°N-’~
Co
—

CCNC)’0

NC

H

H

0)

H

C

N
ON
ON

~0<
~0)
>00

‘0

NCCCC’0

N

C
‘000

~0

0°CCOCC N
C — C CO Co N
CCO’C
0~

N

N CO
0000
C 0°

C

C’)
~
C
0°C’0

~CC~-0N

C0COCo0°~.’C
0°Co

‘0C~C~0°
C
0°

C

~

CoC-CCN

Co

N~N~

CCN0°’0~)

NNNN

COO

N

N 0° N

C~0_Co~-~Co
N
CO

Co00°N~-CC0°

CCNCNN
N N
0°

C0°NN
Co

NC
IC N

C
CO

CoC1C,.o’0

0°CoC’O’0C

‘0CoN~0C0°C

C~-CCoCCN

0001CC

NN

,.oC’0IC000fl
‘0

0ICCoN~’0’0

Co’0C’0N’0
0
N

CCCCo
N

CC

~

0)

01:

C

‘0N

C
01.

a

~
~
N C Co

0)1 C00C~-CCCO,o

~C{~
C

—

C
N

C)

C)
0
CO

~
~0CC

COCC~.0
0° N

C

gi

C)

C

~
~
~
>C).C_._~oEQ~,
CC)000).~.~

~

>-~I

~

o<o.~~C.0~’0)C~PC)z

~

~

~
~~C’)

CCC NC

<~CC

— —

N

~CC~-~ ~O

‘0

—

NOl

C NC ‘00° Co
CC~11~C~c0

00

9’~’C.6C.~2oo~~
~

~

C ‘0 ~-l’~

001)1
~

COC0C0CO~H

1.0000° 0° —

N

COC0C0C0~

CC

C)
CC

~0

C)

0O~

0o~.oCO~

C
‘C
C

146

EMPLO YEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JO URNAL [Vol. 3:131

RICHARD T. SEYMOUR~ : Thank you. I have a paper entitled
“Affirmative Action” which provides excerpts from several editions
of the book I do with a management attorney, Equal Employment
Law Update.” It illustrates the largest disconnect that there is in the
field of equal employment opportunity: the need, on occasion, to take
race or gender into account in making employment decisions, and the
legal constraints that make it difficult to do so.
If anyone doubts that there is sometimes a need to take race into
account, consider that if you are running a police department and you
have to assign somebody to try to infiltrate an ethnically oriented
gang, whether it is Chicanos or blacks or Asians, it is very difficult to
stage a successful infiltration if your police department is mostly
white. You have to have the ability to do investigations that are ef
fective with respect to all groups. But Title VII, of course, does not
have a BFOQ for race, and the courts on both constitutional and
statutory standards have been growing more restrictive on the per
missible bases on which any employer can indulge in race-conscious
or sex-conscious selection.
In a recent case, Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod v. Federal
Communications Commission,’4 the court said that fostering diversity
in programming is not an adequate basis for the FCC to be requiring
licensees to demonstrate their EEO compliance. There are further
proceedings that the FCC will hold, but that is a decision which theo
retically can throw into question much of the activities of the Office
of Federal Contracts Compliance Programs. From my perspective,
this is a very troubling decision.
Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of Boston’~’
upheld an affirmative action promotion even though the employer
based it on an erroneous belief that the promotion was required by a
consent decree. The court found that, apart from the consent decree,
the promotion was justified to remedy prior discrimination.
Taxman v. Board of Education of Township of Piscataway,’6 is
an example of too many of the cases. Taxman was a Third Circuit
case in which there was a teacher layoff, and there was no written af
Director, Employment Discrimination Project. Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Un
der Law.
13. RIcs~j~p~ T. SEYMOUR & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
UPDATE (1998).
14. 141 F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

15. 147 F.3d 13,23-24 (1st Cir. 1998).
16. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
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firmative action plan that had anything to do with layoffs. There was
a provision in the plan that said that the district wanted to increase
the racial diversity of its faculty. The district had no basis for doing so
because the statistics showed that minorities were actually over- rep
resented in each of the schools of the school district compared with
the availability figures. But put that aside. The plan said that when
you have two equally qualified applicants, in order to promote diver
sity you flip a coin. Or you prefer the individual who is black. The
district then applied that provision to a layoff. The school board
members were not sure why they applied it to a layoff. There was
only one deposition, of the president of the board. He failed to iden
tity diversity as a basis for the decision that was being taken. When
the deposition transcript got to him and he noticed that diversity was
not identified as a basis, he altered his testimony in the addendum
sheet that went back to the court reporter. So that is how diversity
came into that case.
In a totally unplanned, uncoordinated, and unjustified fashion,
there are a lot of those plans out there still. It is very easy for plain
tiffs challenging the plans to knock them down. The Taxman case
was sidetracked from a Supreme Court decision, but there is left
standing a Third Circuit rule—like the Fifth Circuit rule—that pro
viding a remedy for past discrimination is the only way to justify a
group conscious selection. That means that if you are in a situation
where you have a predominantly white or all white police force, per
haps because of some of the employment tests that public safety
agencies routinely use, you’re not going to be able to do anything
about investigating crimes that require any undercover work. You’re
not going to be able to assign African American or Hispanic officers,
even though some people in the minority community may find it
more comfortable to deal with those officers when dealing with par
ticular types of crimes.
Police Association of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans,’7 is
another knock-down of diversity. Hopwood v. Texas,” is a case you
all know about. Hop wood is interesting because it illustrates the kind
of thumb on the scale that can occur in litigation. The University of
Texas Law School had no interest in putting on any evidence of its
own past discrimination, if any. It simply failed to address the ques
tion, relying instead on discrimination in all other levels of the Texas
17. 100 F.3d 1159, 1168—69 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. 78 F.3d 932, 935—38 (5th sir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
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educational system. Minority law students tried to intervene to put
on that evidence. Their intervention was denied. So the case went to
judgment based upon an incomplete record because no party had an
interest in putting in any evidence of past discrimination no matter
what its extent would be.
Black Fire Fighters Ass’n of Dallas V. City of Dallas,’9 knocked
out a race-conscious selection practice because it could have bene
fited persons who could never have been victims of discrimination. A
more carefully drafted provision could have passed muster if it were
targeted at those persons who were more likely to have been victims
of past discrimination than others.
Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels,2° says that you can take race
into account where you have selection procedures that have disparate
impact and have not been shown to be valid. One cannot use this
stopgap remedy forever, however, because race-conscious measures
may not be used in order to maintain a racial parity after the elirnina
tion of the effects of past discrimination. The goal is to develop valid
selection procedures,. or ones that have little or no disparate impact,
or a combination of the two.
The Seventh Circuit has a couple of cases, McNamara v. City of
Chicago,2’ and Wittrner v. Peters,22 saying that there are situations in
which operational needs might justify the use of race. That is the only
circuit that has done this so far.
Tharp v. Iowa Department of Corrections,23 says that you can as
sign correctional officers based on sex, where you have female in
mates and you have particular guard positions in which guards would
observe inmates while they’re showering, using the restroom facilities,
and so forth. I have to say that there is no parallel body of law when
it comes to male inmates. Male inmates have been presumed not to
be entitled to any privacy, but the situation is considered differently
with respect to female inmates.
That’s it for this paper. Let me describe what’s going on in the
field of employment discrimination law since you’re all teaching that.
I have to say I have a peculiar perspective on this. Since I’ve started
doing this book for the American Bar Association and BNA, I have
read about 4,000 published appellate decisions in the field of EEO
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

19 F.3d 992, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1994).
31 F.3d 1548, 1571-75 (11th Cir. 1994).
138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cu. 1998), cert. denied, 119 5. Ct. 444 (1998).
87 F.3d 916, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997).
68 F.3d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996).
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law over the last three years. It is an intensive type of experience, but
it also gives one a sense of some broad currents and some areas where
some changes in legal education may be very beneficial for all sides of
the field.
There used to be, until the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a relatively
stable number of fair employment cases filed annually in federal
courts. While federal courts are much less important in states like
California where there are superior state remedies, they are much
more important in cases, across the South for example, where there
are no state law provisions that entitle one to go into court. All
Southern states have are the kind of the state-law provisions that will
qualify them for a subsidy from the EEOC and some role in the in
vestigation of complaints. Federal courts are more important in
states like New York where no common-law torts are recognized.
That is, they are recognized but they are trumped by the workers’
compensation statutes that say they are the exclusive remedy.
The importance of federal statutory claims thus varies enor
mously from state to state. However, there was a relatively stable
number of 8,000 to 9,000 new cases filed per year up through 1991.
Then the number started to increase. It recently reached about
23,000 new fair employment cases filed per year. This is one out of
every eleven and a half civil cases filed in the federal district courts.
It would not be a mistake to call that a “crushing torrent,” like a
storm surge. And like any storm surge, it deforms the structures
through which it passes and strange things begin to appear.
Most fair employment cases are not resolved by trial or by set
tlement; they are resolved by summary judgment. I take that back;
there are no real figures on settlement. But of those cases that are
not settled, a large majority are resolved by summary judgment. I’m
not saying that that’s wrong. I think it’s probably inevitable given the
crush of cases. Given the federalization of what had been previously
many state and local crimes, and given the speedy trial act giving
preference in scheduling to criminal cases, there is a narrowing win
dow of opportunity for the entire civil case load of a federal district
judge. And when there is a huge rush of new cases coming in, there is
a reflexive action—cramp down on it in some way or another.
Some of the courts of appeals. like the Second and Seventh Cir
cuits for example, have been increasingly cautioning that too many
judges are weighing the evidence for themselves in deciding whether
or not the case should proceed to trial. That is a real problem. There
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are aberrations such as the judicial enthusiasm for “cram-down” arbi
tration. I use that pejorative term because if an individual sometimes
wants to work in an industry, as in the securities industry where you
have to fill out a U-4 form in order to register as a broker, you have
to agree to arbitration or you cannot get a job.
If the employers in any industry get together in an association
and decide to impose this type of rule across the board, you may be
deprived of the only livelihood you know how to earn if you will not
agree to the arbitration clause. Like the old Yellow Dog contracts,
providing that “I will never join the union,” this type of contract is an
absolute barrier. It is difficult even to think of this as a contract, in
the sense of it’s being volitional on the part of the employee.
Some companies are putting these mandatory arbitration re
quirements in their application forms. You will not even be consid
ered for a job unless you agree to it.
And what do you get when you agree? Well, we have a case,
Hooters of America v. Phillips,24 in which the company sued our client
to prevent her filing a sexual harassment claim in court. The court
described the facts: “Phillips alleges that in June 1996, Gerald Brooks,
a Hooters official and the brother of HOMB’s principal owner, sexu
ally harassed her by grabbing and slapping her buttocks. After ap
pealing to her manager for help and being told to ‘let it go,’ she quit
her job against the company.”25 So, Hooters sued to force her into its
arbitration system which is characterized by no compensatory dam
ages, and punitive damages capped at one year’s gross cash compen
sation. This amounted to about $13,000 in her case because most of
her income came from tips. Her choice of arbitrators had to be made
from a list, all the members of which were to be pre-selected by
Hooters. There was no requirement of impartiality; the Three
Stooges would have done perfectly well.
And this is far from the only arbitral system which stacks the
deck in favor of the person who unilaterally set up the system. It’s
not like collective-bargaining arbitration where you have an institu
tion, a union, there to protect the interests of employees, which
knows who these players are and how these arbitrators have ruled in
other cases, and which is there to deal with the workplace on an on
going basis. There is not enough time to talk about the other things
that are happening in arbitration except to say that it’s a field in much
24. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
25. Id. at 935.
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flux.
Substantively, the Supreme Court has knocked out a number of
limiting doctrines adopted by the lower courts. Harris v. Forklift
Systems26 knocked out the Sixth Circuit’s requirement of severe psy
chological injury for sexual harassment cases. Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton27 knocked out a series of hurdles that sexual harassment
victims had had to climb and surmount in order to be able to keep
their claim alive under the Eleventh Circuit’s procedures. Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co.28 knocked out the holding of the Fourth Circuit that
former employees have no protection whatsoever from retaliation.
And if you look at the Supreme Court decisions, from the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to the present, in every single case, the
Supreme Court has decided in favor of the civil rights claim at least in
part. The big exception is Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,29 in which the
Supreme Court said that, although the age discrimination act applies
to stereotypes, it does not apply to things that are merely correlated
with age, such as firing employees based upon how much they’re
earning. That may be a proxy for age, there may be a strong correla
tion between age and salary, but that is not a viable claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act unless the employer in
tended to discriminate on the basis of age through the use of this
proxy. However, Hazen Paper also knocked out major restrictions on
the availability of liquidated damages.3° The Supreme Court has got
ten religion, I would suggest to you, in this field over the last seven
years, and is trying to redirect the lower courts toward the goals of the
statutes that are at issue before them. This is a real change, a sea
change. There is a major disconnection between the Supreme Court
and the lower courts, and the Supreme Court, at least, is not bothered
by the flood of cases. It, of course, does not have to deal with the
flood of cases.
Now what are the problems that might be addressed by some re
newed emphasis in the teaching of employment discrimination law?
It seems to me that both sides in the field are afflicted by the problem
of over-reliance on black-letter principles. The biggest realization
that experienced EEO practitioners make is that there is virtually no
rule that is an absolute. There is always a fact pattern that is going to
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

510 U.S. 17 (1993).
524U.S.775 (1998).
519 U.S. 337 (1997).
507 U.S. 604 (1993).
Id. at 616.

152

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol.3:131

make the rationale for a particular rule inapplicable. Once one ar
ticulates what that exception ought to be, there is often broad accep
tance of it. The problem is that too many new attorneys do not think
enough about the purposes of the rules to be able to recognize in ad
vance that there is an exception staring them in the face. That means
that the lawyer for the employer or other defendant cannot advise the
client accurately. It means that the lawyer for the plaintiff may be
relying upon some protection of a black-letter rule that really does
not apply. A renewed appreciation for nuance would help a great
deal.
The second addressable problem I see is the failure—and I have
to say that this is more the fault of plaintiffs’ attorneys than defense
attorneys—to look at the entirety of the employment experience as a
transaction. Looking with blinders, with a rifle-shot focus on one par
ticular .aspect of the employment relationship, results in a failure to
consider the bases on which employers really make their decisions. If
an attorney focuses only on the one decision, she or he is not looking
at what happens with other employees. It may be that the employer’s
treatment of others demonstrates that, whatever was going on here, it
was not race, age, sex, or disability discrimination. The clearest ex
ample I can give of this is that when I was speaking a couple of years
ago to a group of predominantly plaintiffs’ lawyers in Wisconsin, I
was giving the ten top reasons, the “Letterman List,” for why so many
summary judgments are granted against plaintiffs. One of the top
reasons was that the plaintiff’s lawyer made the fundamental mistake
of showing that the basis for the employer’s action was mistaken.
And all of these pens, which had been vigorously scribbling, stopped
in mid-air and mouths started to open. I made the point that the
EEO laws are intentional discrimination statutes. Disparate treat
ment is based on intentional discrimination. So once an attorney has
shown that the employer made a mistake, he or she has got to show
that it was a deliberate mistake or else the attorney has merely shown
a defense. It is the failure to look at the employment relationship in a
larger angle, to have a broader focus, which leads attorneys to bring a
lot of cases that never should have been brought and leads federal
judges to say, as some have, that these cases make them feel like
they’re running a divorce court for the employment relationship.
And I have to tell you that when you’re before a federal judge who
just had a couple of real stinking cases before him, it’s like climbing a
glass mountain without suction cups.
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MARIA O’BRIEN HYLTON~ : A few benefits-related areas have
direct or indirect EEO implications that add to our ongoing discus
sion about disconnect. Three areas are of particular importance: Sec
tion 510 of ERISA31, the anti-discrimination and retaliation provision
of ERISA; the growing problem of worker classification being used
explicitly for the purpose of denying benefits access (“plan participa
tion” access under ERISA); and the 1984 COBRA Amendments32 to
ERISA, which are of special interest to those who deal with issues af
fecting disabled employees.
Section 510 of ERISA makes illegal any change in job status,
which is motivated by a desire to deprive the employee of an ERISA
benefit.33 Section 510 only protects ERISA benefits; an employer
who is motivated by a desire to deprive an employee of a non-ERISA
benefit, and uses that desire in connection with some change of job
status, may violate a state law, but certainly not Section 510 of the
statute. The remedies34 include reinstatement, front and back pay and,
under some circumstances, it is also possible to get attorney’s fees.
What is a job status change under Section 510? The statute enu
merates eight or nine different job status changes that qualify. The
most significant are termination, promotion, layoff and subcontract
ing. The paradigm case in Section 510 jurisprudence is Folz v. Marriot
Corp.35 The case involved a man, Folz, who had worked for a number
of years as a mid-level manager at a Marriot Corporation hotel in
Missouri. Mr. Folz had consistently received above-average or supe
rior employment evaluations, occurring every four to six months, and
experienced steady increases in pay, promotions, and various perks
offered by the corporation. Marriot had, for a very long time, a selfinsured plan. As the payer, Marriot received the doctors’ diagnoses
and notes.
This enabled Marriot to learn at an early stage that Mr. Folz had
been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. While his health remained
steady, Mr. Folz’s employment status declined over the next four
months. For the first time, he began receiving both poor work evalua
tions, and write-ups in his file for very minor infractions of company
Professor, Boston University School of Law.
31. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §~1001-1461 (1994).
32. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100

Stat. 82 (1986).
33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act §510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
35. 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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rules. In a span of slightly less than four months from the time his di
agnosis was made, Folz was terminated. Marriot alleged poor per
formance and inability to perform his job. Mr. FoLz subsequently sued
under Section 510 and the Missouri district court ordered his rein
statement because his employer’s explanation, poor performance, was
pre-textual.36
Almost everyone who teaches Section 510 begins with the Folz
case, in part, because it explicitly steals the McDonnell Douglas37 bur
den shifting test from Title VII jurisprudence. There was, and re
mains, little federal common law under ERISA. The courts of the
1970’s, in an attempt to understand and handle ERISA discrimination
cases, found Title VII cases analogous and appropriated helpful juris
prudence.
A very important distinction is that Section 510 does not prohibit
any kind of plan amendment which would effectively eliminate from
coverage a benefit that might be consequential to a particular plain
tiff; although it is now possible, in certain circumstances, that the
ADA would prohibit that kind of plan amendment. The paradigm
case is McGann v. H&H Music Co.38 McGann was pre-ADA, and in
volved an individual who learned that he was infected with the AIDS
virus. At the time he voluntarily notified his employer, the employer
was not self-insured. Four months subsequent, the employer decided
to self-insure. Interestingly, the only significant difference between
the new self-insured plan and the old plan was that the new plan
capped all benefits for AIDS in a lifetime amount of $5,000. There
had been a $1,000,000 lifetime cap under the old plan. The sole dis
tinction, between the otherwise identical plans, was with respect to
AIDS. The plaintiff in McGann argued vigorously that this was a kind
of targeted discrimination; that the employer made this change in the
plan knowing the plaintiff was infected with the virus, and that he
would need this kind of treatment in the coming months. The Fifth
Circuit said he failed to state a claim made under Section 510.
The last term produced a fairly interesting case, Inter-Modal39, in
which Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous majority, made it
clear that Section 510 apples both to pension and welfare plans.
36. Id. at 10015.
37. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
38. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub noni. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 506
U.S. 981 (1992).
39: Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Ry., Co. 520 U.S.
510 (1997).
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O’Connor makes it clear that Section 510 is broad; it doesn’t matter
whether the underlying benefit is a vested benefit, as in the pension
context, or is a welfare benefit that never vests. It will be interesting
to see what happens to Inter-Modal on remand.4° Inter-Modal in
volved a group of employees in the Los Angeles area who worked at
one of the world’s largest crate stations, unloading cargo and prepar
ing it for transport. The interesting problem in the case is what will
happen when the employer asserts a business justification for the sub
contracting out of the employee’s jobs, which is what took place
there. The cost savings comes entirely from a loss in benefits to the
subcontracted out employees. There will be a fascinating discussion
in the future over whether employers are still free under Section 510,
to subcontract because most subcontracting decisions are motivated
by cost savings. The newly leased employees will either not get health
insurance any longer or they’ll get a much less generous pension.
The classification problem is known by some as the problem of
“temps who aren’t temporary.” The problem is one that really only
arises where there are leased or contract employees who work for a
particular leasing client for an extended period of time. This does not
relate, for example, to temporary secretaries brought in for two
months to fill in for someone on maternity leave, or even those
brought in to work for five or six months. These are individuals, as in
the Microsoft4’ case, who are leased and working for the same client
for, sometimes, more than 15 years. Often these individuals are pro
viding extremely highly skified labor. They work in software, are
lawyers, and are other professionals who find themselves functioning
as leased contract workers for very long periods of time. The real
question in this area is whether there is something about the nature of
the time, combined with the indistinguishable nature of the work
done by the leased worker and the common law employee, that en
courages us at some point in time to think about the “leased” worker
in a different way. Do we want to tell the contracting employer that
when he has had the worker for fifteen years, and the worker’s func
tion is identical to those of the coimnon law employees, that there is a
point at which the employer has to make that employee eligible for
the benefits plan? The issue in the continuing Microsoft case is
whether or not the “leased” workers get to participate in the profit
40. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n. v. Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Ry. Co 117
F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding case to district court).
41. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098
(1998).
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sharing plan, which is much more attractive than the health and dis
ability plan.
The question is what to do about this group of individuals, many
of whom look just like common law employees, who find themselves
barred from the various welfare and pension plans the contracting
employer offers. There are a number of reasons why we have seen
this astronomical growth, in the last few years, in the use of long-term
contract workers.42 One of these is the avoidance of some of the re
quirements of ERISA itself. ERISA has, in its nondiscrimination
rules,43 a series of formulas that disfavor “top heavy plans.” An em
ployer is not allowed to create a welfare or a pension plan that is de
signed to channel moneys principally to the best compensated indi
viduals in the organization and to do little, or nothing, for the less
compensated. But ERISA, for purposes of this formulate calculation,
oniy looks at “regular employees.” It does not include leased employ
ees.
In 1982, as part of TEFRA, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi
bility Act Amendments that were passed, Congress said, for purposes
of these tax-related calculations, the plan sponsor must include leased
employees. The IRS then issued some interpretive guidelines that
were problematic and difficult to understand. The guidelines were
withdrawn, and new guidelines can be expected in 1999. The result is
that there are now a series of artful draftings that elaborate on what
the language of the plan document says. It is important to remember
that, under ERISA, the employer controls, through the plan docu
ment, who participates in the plan, who is entitled to apply, and the
required years of service to participate in the plan.
A few big cases are being litigated now. The Labor Department,
at the end of 1996, sued Time Warner~ over several thousand em
ployees who claimed that they were common law employees of Time
Warner and should therefore be entitled to participate in the plan.
Allstate was sued, in July 1998, by a class of 10,000 temporary work
ers who also claimed to be common law emp1oyees.4~ The numbers
and the sizes of these classes give a general feel for what a very seri
ous part temporary workers play in the employment planning of cer
tain erhployers. All these plaintiffs are seeking essentially the same
42. See Aaron Bernstein, When Is a Temp Not a Temp?. BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 7, 1998, at
90.
43. 29 U.S.C. §1182 (Supp. III 1997).
44. Time warner v. National Labor Relations Board, 160 F.3d 1
45, Bernstein, supra note 12, at 90.

(D.C. cir.

1998).
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thing, eligibility for plan participation.
Finally, the COBRA Amendments46 are familiar to many in the
EEO community, particularly those who have cases involving invol
untary job changes. COBRA requires all employers who have an em
ployee who experiences a “covered event,” 90 percent of which are
terminations, divorce or anything that changes an employee’s eligi
bility for the health plan, to offer that employee 18 to 36 months47 of
health insurance coverage. COBRA does not apply to disability or
other kinds of welfare plans. COBRA mandates health insurance
coverage at 102 percent of the full group rate. This means that if an
individual is in an 80/20 situation, i.e. when she was working the em
ployer was paying 80 percent of the premium and the employee 20
percent, when she is terminated she will be responsible for the full
100 percent of the premium. This allows her to remain in the group,
plus pay an additional 2 percent to cover administrative expensë~
provided for by the statute. For those who are worried about what
might be best for a person who may have an ADA claim but who also
might have experienced job loss discriminatory or not, one has to
consider COBRA. The experience rating with COBRA is, of course,
always disastrous because of a massive adverse selection problem.
The only individuals who elect to remain in the plan when terminated
are those who know that they have a condition, or that a dependent
or family member has a condition, which makes it well worth it for
them to continue the large payments to the plan. Most others drop
out, look for new employment, and hope not to get sick during the
period of time it takes them to find a new job.
Despite the awful experience rating with COBRA, it is important
to remember that an employer cannot deny COBRA benefits. The
employer cannot prohibit, for example, a disabled employee, who has
been terminated, from participating in the plan even if the termina
tion was for cause. Thus, even if an employee did something dreadful
and clearly deserves to be terminated, and there is no contemplated
discrimination claim on behalf of that individual, you will probably
still be looking at someone entitled to COBRA benefits. These kinds
of cases include individuals terminated for embezzling money, as well
as individuals terminated for committing criminal assaults against
fellow workers and supervisors.48 In each of these cases, the federal
—

46. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82 (1986), codified at29 U.S.C. §~ 1161—1169 (1994).
47. See 29 U.S.C. §1162 (2) (1994).
48. COBRA does permit an employer to deny health insurance continuation to employee
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courts have said that the intent of Congress is clear, and that the
benefit is simply triggered by the covered event, termination.
Whether it was a justifiable termination is not important. Thus, when
you have really bad ADA plaintiffs, people who do not have good
stories to tell, and you’re not eager to pursue their claims, these indi
viduals might be encouraged, nonetheless, to pursue benefits under
COBRA as a way of protecting their health insurance status during
their search for new work.

PAULETTE CALDWELL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Our own experience tells us, and social scientists confirm, that we
respond to each other on the basis of social categories, categories
which carry stereotypes and myths that persist over time despite the
most cogent contrary evidence. When individuals are members of
more than one traditionally disadvantaged category, the discrimina
tion they suffer may be different, often worse, than discrimination on
the basis of one category alone. Yet most lawyers, judges, and human
resource personnel do not acknowledge the fact of discrimination on
the basis of multiple proscribed factors.
Employment discrimination laws are structured to handle dis
crimination one category at a time.49 Yet individuals may face dis
terminated for “gross misconduct.” 29 U.s.c. § 1163(2) (1994). Where a court found that an
employer’s testimony on the employee’s alleged gross misconduct was not credible, it found that
the employee had been fired for “mere incompetency,” which was not gross misconduct. There
fore, COBRA notice was required. Misna v. United Communications, Inc. 91 F.3d 876 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Moos v. Square D Co., 72 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1995) (employer held not to have
violated ERISA when it denied severance benefits to an employee who had been discharged
twice for having falsified his job applications with regard to his educational background. Sever
ance plan allowed benefits to be denied where an employee had engaged in conduct winch
caused “material and demonstrable injury to the company.”). However, an employee’s dis
charge for operating a company vehicle while intoxicated was held to be for “gross misconduct,”
Collins v. Aggreko, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 450 (D. Utah 1995), as was a bank employee’s discharge
for alleged misuse of a company credit card and misrepresentation of the status of a customer’s
account to the SBA. Jo~mso11 v. Shawmut Nat’l Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437 (0. Ma.
1994). A refusal to offer COBRA coverage to a terminated employee must be supported by a
record which demonstrates that the employee actually committed or engaged in gross miscon
duct, not just that the employer had a good faith belief that the employee had engaged in gross
misconduct. Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Transport Corp., 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
Professor of Law, New York University.
49. This discussion is limited to the three major federal employment discrimination stat
utes, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §~ 2000e to 2000e-17(1994); The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §1 621-50 (1994); and the Americans with
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crimination solely on the basis of one factor, or because of two or
more factors separately,5° or because of the combination or interac
tion of two or more factors.31 In cases where the discrimination com
plained of results from the interaction of two or more factors, the fac
tors may be prohibited bases for employment decisions under the
same or separate anti-discrimination statutes.
Unlike the 1960’s, when comprehensive federal antidiscrimination laws were initiated, today’s workforce consist of large
numbers of women, racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals af
fected with disabilities. All are present at every age including midlife
and older ages. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a
growing number of discrimination claims involve the combined ef
fects of more than one form of bias protected under one or more
source of employment discrimination law.
The existence of multi-discrimination claims provides a useful
point from which to consider the question whether or not a dysjunc
ture exists between the structure of employment discrimination law
and the profile of today’s and tomorrow’s workforce. Such an inquiry
allows for a fuller exploration of the misunderstandings about the na
ture of various forms of discrimination and their relationship one to
another. An analysis of the judicial response to claims involving the
intersection of two factors52 under a single employment discrimination
statute suggests that this response may be of limited utility for claims
arising under disparate statutory protections.
The incidence of employment discrimination claims involving a
variety of intersecting factors is not clear. Nevertheless, the changing
demographics of the workforce suggest that such claims are likely to
increase. Coupled with this likely increase, the general lack of sophis
tication by courts and employment discrimination professionals
commands further education and study.

Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §~ 12101-12213(1994). However, employment discrimination plaintiffs
may rely on multiple sources of state and federal statutory and state common law.
50. For example, an employer may discriminate on the grounds of race in hiring decisions
and on the grounds of gender in compensation.
51. For example, an employer may hire black men and white women but discriminate
against black women.
52. While it is possible for a single claim to involve the interaction of more than two factors
under a single statute such as Title VII, winch prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin, this article will only consider cases involving the interac
tion of two factors.
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II. THE HISTORY OF INTERSECTIONAL LEGAL THEORY
A. Claims Under A Single Statute
Employment discrimination claims based on the intersectional
effect of two bases for discrimination are not new, but the initial judi
cial response was to reject them as attempts either to create a pro
tected group not recognized by law or to obtain more relief than
Congress intended to provide. For Example, in Degraffenreid v. Gen
eral Motors Assembly Division~3 in a combined claim brought by a
black woman, the district court analyzed the race and sex claims as
distinct and separate claims. It found no race bias because a black
male had received a promotion and no sex discrimination because
there were white females on the employer’s staff.
In 1980, however, in an action brought by a black woman, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s deci
sion dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint and held that black women
constitute a subgroup for purposes of protection under Title Vu.54
The Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth in 1994.~~ Both courts rejected the
initial judicial approach which prohibited the creation of distinct sub
groups under Title VII as counter to the intention of Congress and an
attempt to create a super-remedy not provided for by law.
The decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are supported by a
substantial body of academic literature detailing the nature and inci
dence of intersectional bias.56 However, it would be misleading to
suggest that intersectional theory is firmly grounded in employment
discrimination law. Strands of the Degraffenreid court’s criticisms of
intersectional claims under Title VII reappear in later decisions re
53. 413 F. Supp. 142. 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976), off d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558
F.2d 480 (1977).
54. Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). In
Jeffries, the plaintiff claimed she had been denied a promotion based on her race and sex oper
ating together. The district court based its decision dismissing her complaint on the fact that a
black man had received a promoted and the employer also employed white women. The Fifth
Circuit noted that an employer could not defend against discrimination against black women by
pointing to progress with respect to the treatment of blacks or women in general.
55. Lain v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, (9th Cir. 1994).
56. See. e.g.. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 wisc. L. REV. 539; Paulette Caidwell,
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L. J. 365; Maria
Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GoLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 817 (1993); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our
Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989).
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jecting intersectional claims that involve two or more bases of dis
crimination protected under two or more separate statutes, and the
reappearance of these criticisms could undermine the continued rec
ognition of intersectional claims under Title VII.

B. Claims Involving Two Or More Statutes
The case for such claims under one statute, such as Title VII, is
relatively easy to make.57 However, claims involving discrimination
protected against under two or more statutes present distinct theo
retical and practical problems. To date, far fewer cases involving
more than one statute have been adjudicated, and academic research
on cross-statute multi-discrimination claims is sparse.” Nevertheless,
the probable increase in the number of these claims in the future has
attracted the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com
mission59 and the Glass Ceiling Commission.6’
The response by courts to intersectional claims arising under
separate employment discrimination statutes is mixed. Several dis
trict court decisions adopt the intersectional theory of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits in Title VII cases for claims arising across statutory
protections, for example, combined claims alleging age and gender
discrimination.6’ One such opinion permitted a plaintiff to proceed
with a claim alleging discrimination on three distinct bases arising un
der three separate statutes—gender, age, and disability.62 However
57. According to the Fifth Circuit in Jeffries, “an employer should not escape from liability
for discrimination against black females by a showing that it does not discriminate against blacks
and that it does not discriminate against females... [D]iscrimination against black females can
exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.” 615 F.2d at
1032. Notably, the court relied on Congress’ use of the word “or” in Title VII as evidence that
Congress intended to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed char
acteristics. Id.
58. But see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MIDLuE AND OLDER WOMEN: How COURTS TREAT SEX-ANDAGE DISCRIMINATION CASES, 1, (1996). [hereinafter, “AARP SrUDY”]
59. See Chris Vidas, Labor Law: Combined Multiple Discrimination Claims Are Emerging
Area of Employment Bias Law, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) Aug. 13, 1996 at D23.
60. See GLASS CEILING COMMISSION REPORT, A SOLID INVESTMENT: MAKING FULL USE
OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 18 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Good v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1968 (D. Ore.
Feb. 16, 1995); Arnett v. Aspsin, 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also, Blonder v.
Evanston Hosp. Corp., 1992 WI. 44404 (ND. Ill. Mar. 2, 1992)(age-related disability).
62. Soggs v. American Airlines, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); see also Zeil
v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1979), (alleging combined discrimination based on
three factors—sex, age, and national origin—under two statutes).
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the majority of cross-statutory claims have been rejected, often on the
basis of reasoning that falls back on the position of the court in De
graffenreid: various federal employment discrimination statutes pro
vide distinct protections for different forms of discrimination reflect
ing Congress’ intention to treat them differently. These courts
apparently distinguish Jeffries and Lain, which support protection
against combined race and sex discrimination, on the ground that
those cases close a loophole in Title VII. They thereby grant plain
tiffs the full protection of one statute but do not support combined
discrimination occurring across statutes. Accordingly, claims based on
discriminatory factors protected under separate statutes must be
analyzed as two distinct claims.63
Cross-statutory intersectional claims also present a practical
problem which does not arise in intersectional claims under Title VII.
The disparate impact proof model is available under Title VII and the
Americans With Disabilities Act. A few early cases which recognize
cross-statutory claims where a part of the claim alleged age discrimi
nation have been allowed to proceed as disparate impact claims.64
However, these cases were decided before the recent round of debate
over the propriety of the disparate impact proof model for age dis
crimination cases. Therefore, even if courts permit cross-statutory
claims to proceed, it is not clear whether disparate impact proof will
be available in any claim based in part on age discrimination. To the
extent the disparate impact proof model remains a viable antidiscrimination tool, limiting its availability in some cross-statutory
claims could greatly affect their efficacy.6’

63. See Murdock v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct.App. Dec 30, 1992).
64. See Haskins v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.. 35 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA)
256 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
65. See Ellis v. United Airlines Health & Human Servs., Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996)(no disparate impact proof afiowed in age discrimination challenge
by female applicants for flight attendant to the disparate impact of employer’s weight require
ments on older female applicants in comparison with weight allowances for incumbent female
flight attendants).
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III. THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THE REACH OF INTERSECTIONAL
THEORY

The fact that most courts reject intersectional claims based on
two or more sources of law designed to protect against distinct forms
of bias raises two deeper concerns that are not reflected in the court
decisions themselves. The initial problem is demographic. When
Congress passed the employment discrimination legislation of the
1960’s, it treated different forms of discrimination as if they presented
distinct social and economic problems. It sought to protect women
and racial minorities under Title VII and older workers under the
ADEA. The two groups always overlapped, but they do so today to a
greater extent than ever before. For example, eighteen million
women over the age of 40 participate in today’s workforce; 75 percent
of women between the ages of 45 and 54, 50 percent of women be
tween 55 and 64, and upwards of 10 percent of women over the age of
65 are employed or seeking employment.66 It should be obvious that
women in mid-life and older face the possibility of combined age and
gender discrimination with respect to all aspects of employment.67
Second, different bases of discrimination are related in ways that
are not reflected in the structure of employment discrimination laws.
Congress understood when it passed Title VII that racism and sexism
often arise from stereotypes, but, according to the 1965 report to
Congress by the then Secretary of Labor, age discrimination does
not.68 Recent court decisions reflect a more enlightened view of age
discrimination,69 but they do not necessarily recognize that stereo
types about women and racial minorities persist, if not intensify, into
midlife and older years.7° Wherever possible, disability should be
66. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, EIVU’LOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST MIDLG’E AND OLDER wOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF DISCRIMINATION CHARGES FILED
WITH TIlE EEOC 1(1997).
67. The AARP study identified 335 combined sex and age discrimination cases reported
between 1975 and 1995. Eighty-one percent of these cases were brought by women. A smaller
but significant number (16%) were brought by men. AARP STUDY, supra note 10, at 3.
68. REPORT OF TEE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN wORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 21 (1965), (age discrimination does not result from “dislike
or intolerance” or from “feelings about people entirely unrelated to their ability to do the
job.”); id. at 6, (“There are no such prejudices in American life which apply to older persons and
which would carry over so strongly into the sphere of employment.”).
69. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), Justice O’Connor emphasized that
the ADEA was enacted in response to Congress’ concern that older workers were being denied
employment opportunities on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing sterotypes.
70. See, e g., Straka v. Francis, 867 F. Supp. 767, 771 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (Female flight atten
dants on planes chartered for professional sports teams complained of combined age and sex
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taken into account and accommodated. Age, like race, gender, on the
other hand, should be ignored.7’ This, notwithstanding the fact that
the incidence of disability increases with age. Not irrationally, a per
son who becomes disabled after age 40 may fear losing protection
against age discrimination by seeking to have his or her disability ac
commodated.
This misunderstanding about the relationship of various bases of
discrimination is particularly relevant to the debate over the avail
ability of disparate impact proof in age discrimination cases. The Su
preme Court has acknowledged the utility of the disparate impact
proof model in ferreting out stereotypes against women and racial
minorities under Title Vu72 (and given its availability under the
ADA, disabled individuals as well). Older women, racial minorities
and disabled individuals may lose this protection whenever their
claims involve age discrimination as a factor whether or not they pre
sent their claims under two or more statutes or exclusively under the
ADEA.

IV. THE FUTURE OF INTERSECTIONAL THEORY
Determining the incidence of intersectional bias is not easy.73
Courts and employment discrimination counsel lack sophistication
about intersectional claims, and this lack of understanding may con
tribute to the low number of reported cases that present or address
the problems of multi-discrimination claims. However, the changing
demographics of the workforce alone may pose the greatest barrier to
the expansion of intersectional theory. The spectre of myriad sub
groups presenting claims both within and across statutory protections,
coupled with the massive increase in all discrimination claims, may
lead the courts or Congress to prohibit all intersectional claims.
Moreover, in some cases, the use of intersectional theory may not be
harassment in the comments of management employees about their physical appearance and
attire. In addition, the plaintiffs were subjected to comments that they were too old to be flight
attendants and should “not act like [passengers’] mothers.”).
71. Race and gender-based affirmative action, of course, present special circumstances.
72. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.s. 977 (1988), the Supreme Court
held that the disparate impact proof model applied to subject as well as objective factors in part
because of the existence of subconscious stereotypes and biases that could not be adequately
policed through a disparate treatment theory requiring the proof of discriminatory motivation.
73. The AARP study, winch relies on reported cases, notes the several limitations of this
research methodology. AARP STUDY, supra nOte 10, at 1.
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in the best interest of employment discrimination claimants. Finally,
any attempt to preserve disparate impact liability for combined
claims involving age discrimination as one factor may lead ultimately
to a further watering down of the disparate impact proof model for all
employment discrimination litigation.
In any event, the problem of combined or interactive discrimina
tion warrants further study if we are to assure that our employment
discrimination laws are suited to the realities of today’s workforce
and the workforce of the future. By the year 2000, two-thirds of new
entrants to the labor force will be women and racial and ethnic mi
norities,74 all of whom will also need protection against age and dis
ability-based discrimination. The theoretical and practical problems
presented by interactive claims can be solved with thoughtful innova
tion. This innovation will depend on further documentation of the in
cidence of interactive claims and on increasing the awareness of
judges, lawyers and other employment discrimination professionals
about the nature of such claims.

74. See GLASS CEILING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12.

